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Abstracts of Recent Cases
Federal District Court Has No Power to
Suspend Sentence After Commencement of
Term-Defendant had been convicted under
an indictment containing five counts and
sentenced to serve a period of imprisonment
under each count, such periods to run consecu-
tively. After serving the time alloted to counts
one and two, he petitioned the district court
that sentenced him to grant probation as to
the remaining counts. The Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit in a 2-1 decision affirmed
the district court's determination that it was
without power to grant the motion. Phillips
v. United States, 212 F.2d 327 (8th cir. 1954).
The court held that the defendant was in effect
asking the district court to overrule the Board
of Parole, with its superior opportunity to
appraise his conduct, and that such would be
usurpation of the authority of the executive
branch. Moreover, the court observed that the
passing of sentence represents the time when a
criminal case should be finally disposed of by
a district court. The ninth circuit, Kirk v.
United States, 185 F.2d 185 (9th cir. 1950),
has come to the opposite conclusion. The in-
stant court expressed the hope that the Su-
preme Court would grant certiorari in the in-
terest of uniformity throughout the circuits.
Discharge of Jury Held to Bar Subsequent
Prosecution-After the third day of a murder
trial the jurors were taken to a local hotel for
the night. During the night, the police, upon
being called to investigate the conduct of the
jurors, found three in an intoxicated condition.
When the court was convened the next day,
in the absence of the jury and upon the testi-
mony of the officers, the judge withdrew a
juror and declared a mistrial. The Supreme
Court of North Carolina upheld defendant's
plea of former jeopardy and reversed a subse-
quent conviction for manslaughter. State v.
Crocker, 239 N.C. 446, 80 S.E.2d 243 (1954).
It is generally held that an order of mistrial,
even in capital cases, rests in the discretion of
the trial judge and will not be reviewed unless
there is a clear abuse of discretion. However, a
mistrial should be ordered only under urgent
circumstances and only after a plain cause has
been shown to exist. Thus the court ruled that
"where no evidence is heard and no finding of
facts are made as to the crucial question, i.e.
the condition and fitness of the juror(s) to
continue their service when court convened...
there is no sufficient factual basis for the trial
judge in the exercise of his discretion to order
a mistrial "
State Immunity Statute Does Not Destroy
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination If Wit-
ness Reasonably Fears Federal Prosecution-
Relator was subpoenaed before a grand jury in
Dade County, Florida in connection with an
investigation into gambling activities. He was
held in contempt for refusal to answer eleven
questions on the ground that his answers would
tend to incriminate him in the state and federal
courts, whereupon he filed a writ of habeas
corpus in the Supreme Court of Florida. Re-
spondent, the sheriff of Dade County, then
filed a motion to quash, alleging that relator
was immune from prosecution in the state
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court by statute, and that the privilege against
self-incrimination conferred by the Constitu-
tion of Florida pertains only to proceedings
under the laws of that state. Held, the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination exonerates from
disclosure whenever there is a reasonable
probability of prosecution in state or federal
jurisdictions. State ex rel. Mitchell v. Kelly,
71 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1954). Federal immunity
statutes afford protection in the state courts by
a general prohibition of "prosecution". A state
immunity stature, on the other hand, cannot
afford protection against federal action. As
the dissent argues, ordinarily the privilege
against self-incrimination extends only to
offenses of the interrogating sovereignty. The
decision of the court can thus be regarded as
a matter of policy.
State Statute Making Possession of Federal
Gambling Tax Stamp Prima Facie Evidence
of Gambling Violation Upheld-The Florida
Supreme Court has held that due process does
not prevent a state from making possession of
a federal tax stamp prima facie evidence of
guilt in a prosecution for violation of the state
gambling laws. Jefferson v. Sweat, 23 U.S.L.
Week 2070 (August 10, 1954). The court
declared that the power of the legislature to
enact that one fact or set of facts may be
presumptive evidence of another is generally
conceded. However, there must be a rational
connection between the fact proved and the
ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of
one from proof of the other is not unreasonable
and arbitrary. Moreover, the accused must
have a fair opportunity to make his defense in
rebuttal and to remove the presumption. The
court in determining that these conditions had
been fulfilled said that a gambling stamp is
secured for limited purposes only and "if the
holder did in fact secure it to adorn his office
or hang in the drawing room beside grandpa's
picture ... he is at liberty to prove it....
Husband Convicted for Larceny of Wife's
Property-In a case of first impression in New
York, an appellate court ruled that the present
statutory law permits a husband to be con-
victed for larceny of his wife's property.
People v. Morton, '132 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1954).
The common law concepts that a wife could not
own property separate from her husband and
that neither spouse was a "person" separate
and apart from the other, formerlkr prevented
such an action. The court declared that under
present legislation husband and wife may each
be a party to an action as if single; each is
alone liable for his or her tortious act; each may
carry on a separate business; each may own
and dispose of property; each may contract
with the other as if unmarried, and each may
sue the other for injuries to person or property.
Therefore, "it would be a retrogression to hold
that, though a husband may be convicted for
stealing from anybody else in the world, he
may not be convicted for stealing from his
wife." In other states, where the question has
been raised, there is a conflict of authority.
Circumstantial Nature of Evidence Does
Not Require Proving Guilt to a Moral Cer-
tainty Rather Than Merely Beyond Reason-
able Doubt-The convicted criminal defen-
dant argued on appeal that the evidence against
him being entirely circumstantial, the state
must prove his guilt to a moral certainty. The
court, in rejecting this contention, recognized
that there are a number of cases using this
phrase. However, it is clearly settled that a
man may be convicted on circumstantial
evidence alone, provided his guilt is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. The type of evi-
"dence does not alter the standard to be ap-
plied. The court cautioned "that the use of
the words 'moral certainty' serves to confuse
and befog the jury instead of enlightening and
aiding them in determining whether the com-
monwealth has convinced them of the guilt of
the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that in the future it would be wiser if the
charge did not contain any reference to 'moral
certainty'." Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 106 A.2d
820 (Pa. 1954).
Statute Rendering Criminal the Association
With Known Thieves Declared Unconstitu-
tional-A California statute providing for a
19541
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vagrancy conviction of anyone found to be
"an: associate of known thieves" has been
declared unconstitutional by a California
superior court. The court reasoned that "if
it can be made a penal offense for a person to
associate with those of his own choosing, how-
ever disreputable they may be, when not in
furtherance of some overt act of public in-
decency or the perpetration of some crime,
then it necessarily follows that by the same
authority he may be compelled to associate
with persons not of his own choosing. Our
constitution and laws guarantee to every citi-
zen the right to go where and when he pleases
and to associate with whom he pleases, exact-
ingfrom him only that he conducts himself in
a decent and orderly manner, that he disturb
no one and he interfere with the rights of no
other citizen. We deny the power of any legisla-
tive body in this country to choose for our
citizens whom their associates shall be."
People v. Berta, 23 U.S.L. Week 2070 (August
10, 1954).
Pennsylvania Joins States Which Admit
Evidence Obtained by Wire-Tapping-The
trial court admitted into evidence the testimony
of local police officers relating conversations of
the accused heard through tapping a telephone
wire. Defendant's conviction on the charge of
bookmaking followed. On appeal, affirmed.
Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 107 A.2d 214 (1954).
The highest courts of New York, Maryland,
California, and Texas are in accord with this
decision. At common law the admissibility of
evidence was not affected by the illegality of
the means by which it was obtained. In the
federal courts, however, evidence obtained
illegally by federal officers is excluded. This
rule of evidence is not binding upon the state
courts and two-thirds of the states, including
Pennsylvania, have adhered to the common law
rle.
The appellant thus based his principal con-
tention on Section 605 of the Federal Com-
munication Act which provides, "no person...
shall intercept any communication and di-
vulge. .. the ... contents.... ." He advanced
the novel argument that since state officials
are subject to federal prosecution for obtaining
evidence in violation of the Act even though
the evidence is admissible in a state court, the
court participates in a crime by allowing its
admission. The court dismissed this contention
saying, "How can Congress intend to make a
crime of what it did not intend to prohibit?"
Section 605 was termed a "sneak amendment"
by the court because it was a rider on a bigger
bill and because of the failure of Congress
to enact- legislation prohibiting wire-tapping
every time the issue was directly presented to
it. Therefore, the court reasoned that while
this does not affects its validity, it substantially
weakens its persuasiveness upon a court not
bound by it.
The dissent pointed out that since this ques-"
tion has never been passed upon by an appellate
court in the State of Pennsylvania, the rule of
stare decisis is not binding as it is regarding the
admissibility of evidence obtained by an illegal
search or seizure. An attempt was made to
draw 'a distinction between wire-tapping and
other means of illegally obtaining evidence.
"An illegal search or seizure is open and no-
torious and can be readily redressed, whereas
the interference with the person's privacy of
conversation is necessarily secret" and "he is
therefore not in a position to invoke official
machinery to protect himself." While this
question is still open the courts should "take
a sound American position" and refuse to ad-
mit such evidence. The dissent also suggests
that evidence obtained through wire-tapping
might be justified in "the detection of crimes of
great social significance even though not
justifiable in cases such as the present."
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